Why de facto states fail? Lessons from Chechen Republic of Ichkeria by Aliyev, Huseyn & Souleimanov, Emil Aslan
Aliyev, H. and Souleimanov, E. A. (2018) Why de facto states fail? Lessons 
from Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Problems of Post-Communism, 66(3), pp. 
161-171. (doi:10.1080/10758216.2017.1383166) 
This is the author’s final accepted version. 
There may be differences between this version and the published version.  
You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/151645/ 
Deposited on:  15 November 2017 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk 
 1 
Why de facto states fail? Lessons from the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria 
 
 
Huseyn Aliyev and Emil A. Souleimanov  
 
 
This study seeks to improve our understanding of the causes leading to the failure of de facto 
states. In contrast to the voluminous body of literature on sovereign state failure, the process 
of de facto state’s failure remains under-researched. Drawing upon the existing research on 
state failure and de facto statehood, we narrow down our theoretical explanations to a set of 
causes related to civil conflict, tribalism and economic crisis. More specifically, we aim to 
examine the effect of tribalism, warlordism, ideological fractionalisation and economic 
deficiencies upon the collapse and failure of de facto entities. We employ the case study of 
the interwar Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (1996-1999) to demonstrate how the above 





In 2014, armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine has led to the appearance of two de facto 
independent pro-Russian rebel enclaves – Donetsk Peoples Republic (DPR) and Lugansk 
People Republic (LPR). The emergence of these new de facto entities in the heart of Eastern 
Europe reignited the debates on de facto statehood in Eurasia and beyond. As Russian 
Federation – already a patron state for Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria – provided 
military and financial support to DPR and LPR, scholars and practitioners alike continue to 
be puzzled by what makes a de facto entity sustainable. Previous theoretical studies posited 
that a combination of the absence of nation-building, strong military and a weak parent state, 
as well as a strong patron, are most likely to lead to the collapse of a de facto state (Kolstø 
2006).i Nonetheless, research on de facto states is rife with case-study literature examining 
the unrecognised states’ emergence and functioning, rather than their demise. The survival 
and persistence of de facto states has attracted a great deal of scholarly attention over the past 
two decades. A voluminous body of case-study literature offers a detailed analysis of de facto 
states’ resilience and survival, drawing examples not only from the durable post-Soviet de 
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facto states, but also from similarly resilient and successful de facto states in Somalia, 
Myanmar, the Philippines and other parts of the world.  
Both nuanced case study research on why and how de facto states fail, or systematic 
theoretical examination of the de facto states’ failure, has been thus far absent from the IR 
and political studies literature.  Nearly 40% of all de facto states tend to fail within first 24 
months of their emergence (Florea 2014, 792). However, interest towards the failure of 
unrecognised states has thus far been rather limited. Contextualised empirical analyses of 
why, when and under which circumstances de facto entities collapse and cease to exist are 
notable by their absence. Similarly, few studies offer theoretically-grounded explanations as 
to which factors are likely to conduce the failure and collapse of de facto entities. 
That said, this study seeks to provide an empirically rich and theoretically-guided 
account of de facto statehood’s failure. Drawing our empirical case study from interwar 
Chechnya (1996-1999), we demonstrate that the failure of de facto states is a complex 
phenomenon that combines common factors of nation-state failure and the processes specific 
to de facto entities. We ground our theoretical framework in literature on both state failure 
and the post-WWII de facto statehood. We argue theoretically – and demonstrate it 
empirically on the case of the Chechen de facto state – that tribalism, warlordism, ideological 
fractionalisation and economic deficiencies emerge as significant determinants of the de facto 
states’ demise. This study is the first to examine in details the effect of the four above-
mentioned factors on de facto states’ failure. We seek to show that the key factors identified 
in the literature behind the success of de facto states – such as nation-building, strong military 
and weak parent state – are not static indicators. Rather, these factors of the de facto 
statehood’s success are susceptible to change that might as well lead to the collapse of the 
entities. We argue that although many aspects of the de facto states’ failure are comparable to 
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the collapse and failure of sovereign states, failure processes in unrecognised states tend 
follow their own pathways, which remain distinguishable from nation-state failure.   
This article is organised as follows. Next two sections delve into the theories of state 
failure and de facto statehood, seeking to link the two strands of literature. We then present a 
theoretically grounded explanation of how tribalism, warlordism, ideological fractionalisation 
and economic challenges may precipitate the failure of a de facto state. This section is 
followed by an empirical discussion of the Chechen case. Split into the four key themes – 
each covering one of the above detailed factors of de facto state failure – empirical discussion 
traces the collapse and ultimate demise in the late 1990s of a de facto state known as the 
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.     
 
When states failii  
 
Existing research on state failure draws close connections between the weakness, or the 
collapse, of a nation-state and the emergence of unrecognised polities (Rotberg 2010). The 
loss of state’s capacity to control its territory and the weakness of its military are directly 
associated with the emergence of regime challengers seeking to partition the state along 
ethnic, sectarian or ideological divides (Kraxberger 2007). Multi-ethnic states, as well as 
countries with clear-cut ideological divisions are amongst the most obvious candidates for de 
facto secessionism in moments of state weakness and political instability. 
The literature on state failure tends to prioritise two – at times mutually interdependent 
– failure factors. To start with, violent civil conflict is presented as a key driver of state 
fragility and failure that undermines state institutions, destroys infrastructure and encourages 
separatism (Rotberg 2010; Vinci 2008; Aliyev 2017). For instance, Rotberg (2004, 5) in his 
major volume on state failure identifies intrastate warfare as an inseparable attribute of the 
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majority of failed states. Indeed, from Afghanistan to East Timor, armed violence appears to 
be the crucial variable in state weakness and collapse. All eight countries currently listed by 
the State Fragility Indexiii as highly fragile (or failed) are affected by civil war-related 
violence. Five of these countries (Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Yemen), at 
various stages of their recent history have either hosted de facto entities, or themselves 
existed as de facto states. 
Another major factor prioritised in state failure studies is an economic collapse that in 
many cases tends to directly accompany conflict-affected fragile states. Whilst in some failed 
states, economic challenges emerge as a result of armed conflict, for many others, economic 
underperformance is chronic and is often at the root of civil violence (Iqbal and Starr 2015). 
Poor economic performance is often intertwined with corruption and nepotism, endemic to 
many developing countries. Unequal distribution of revenues from natural resources in 
countries endowed with mineral resources have historically been behind secessionist conflicts 
in resources-rich ethnic regions. The emergence of such de facto entities as Biafra in Nigeria, 
South Sudan (before independence), as well as Katanga in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), were potentially fuelled – amongst other causes – by inherent grievances over the 
mismanagement of natural resources in these regions. Poor governance, corruption, political 
favouritism and the overall failure of development are other common causes of state failure 
that are often intertwined with, or precede, civil conflict and economic collapse (Iqbal and 
Starr 2015). 
All of the above creates conditions beneficial for and conducive not only to state 
failure, but also for successful secessionism and the establishment of a durable de facto 
polity. Indeed, the cases of effective de facto statehood in the absence of parent state’s 
fragility are few. The list of post-WWII de facto states, complied by Florea (2014, 793), 
entirely consists of parent states, which had been either fragile or highly fragile through 
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significant periods of their modern history. This draws an inseparable link between state 
weakness, or failure, and the emergence of de facto states. However, the relationship between 
state failure and de facto statehood is not only crucial for the birth of de facto entities, but is 
also engraved in their own demise.      
 
When de facto states fail 
 
De facto states differ from recognised polities in many aspects, but they also share numerous 
similarities with nation-states. One of these analogies is that de facto entities are just as likely 
(if not more) to experience weakness, failure and collapse as recognised states.iv We 
understand the failure of de facto states in the same terms as the failure of sovereign states 
(Iqbal and Starr 2015, 12). The failure of de facto states’ attempt to achieve political 
independence does not equal to state failure and the loss by de facto entities of their capacity 
to control the territory and to provide their population with public goods does not mean that 
these states will cease to exist.  As is the case with many de facto states, weakness and the 
failure of a parent state are conducive and beneficial towards the emergence of de facto 
statehood. However, many if not all de facto polities are doomed to inherit most of the 
weaknesses of their parent state. The lack of international recognition, absent or destroyed by 
war industries, often land-locked location, lack of experienced administrations, and numerous 
other malaises make the de facto states’ plight even more precarious. The most logical 
assumption to be extracted from the literature on state failure is that armed conflict, economic 
deficiencies and poor governance should undermine de facto states as fast, or even faster, as 
recognised polities. Other factors that influence survival of de facto states include support 
from patrons, other countries or stakeholders, relations between the leadership and other 
actors of the parent state and the breakaway region. Bearing in mind that existing literature on 
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de facto statehood has already explored external factors in sufficient depth, detailed 
discussion of these factors is beyond the scope of this study.  
Nevertheless, remarkable endurance of de facto entities in the face of all these 
challenges had been detailed by a large and growing body of empirical literature on de facto 
statehood, particularly in the former Soviet Union (Baev 1998; Kolosov and O’Loughlin 
1998; Beissinger and Young 2002). One noteworthy difference between the nation-state and 
the de facto state failure is that the latter is very likely to culminate in the disappearance of 
the de facto entity and its reintegration with a parent state. This makes it even more 
imperative for de facto states to avoid failure at all costs. While failure of a de facto state 
significantly increases the likelihood of its disappearance, failed de facto state may still 
continue to exist for as long as its capable to ward off the attempts by parent state to absorb it. 
Despite the looming threat of military invasion from a parent state, stagnant economic 
performance that many currently existing de facto states share, and chronically poor 
governance, a surprisingly high percentage of de facto entities manage to survive. Moreover, 
the emergence of the east Ukraine’s DPR and LPR over two years ago and the imminent 
possibility of a Kurdish de facto entity in Syria, suggest that the numbers of de facto states 
continue growing. The de facto states’ durability further increases the importance of 
understanding how and why these entities meet their end. 
Research on de facto statehood maintains that effective nation-building, strong military, 
weakness of parent state, and the existence of a strong patron enable de facto states to survive 
irrespectively of their deficiencies (Kolstø 2006, 729). Most studies, however, consider the 
above factors as static and make few efforts to explain what happens if de facto states fail at 
nation-building. Are their military forces always strong? What happens when a parent state 
manages to overcome its weaknesses? What happens when a patron either decides to stop 
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supporting a de facto entity (Serb republic Krajina in Croatia), or when a de facto state does 
not have a patron (Tamil Eelam, Chechnya)? 
The main theoretical argument of this paper is that de facto states fail due to a 
combination of factors, most of which are associated with armed violence, socio-political 
cleavages, and economic collapse. The de facto failure is a far more complex phenomenon 
than it is often portrayed in the literature. Conflict violence and economic deficiencies are 
often embedded into a patchwork of intervening factors. With that in mind, we outline 
tribalism, warlordism, ideological fractionalisation and economic deficiencies as key 
determinants of de facto failure, present in our Chechen case study and traceable in a number 
of other “failed” de facto entities. We do not seek to underrate the significance of other 
factors of de facto states’ failure, and therefore our objective is to analyse the above detailed 
set of four factors not as exclusive but as complimentary to other scenarios of de facto state 




In many secessionist conflicts, clan and/or tribal identities are amongst the key sub-ethnic 
forms of fractionalisation (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010) and violent conflict 
mobilisation (Souleimanov and Aliyev 2014; 2015). Whilst for some de facto entities – 
particularly in post-communist Eastern Europe – clan divisions persist along oligarchic 
interests, or geographical origins of individuals (Donetsk clan) (Aliyev 2017; Kuzio 2014), 
for many other societies, clans are embedded in tribal and ethnic structures. Given that both 
clan- and tribe-based divisions entail fractionalisation into relatively small groups of 
individuals – as opposed to ethnicity-centred factionalism – it is potentially detrimental to 
both nation- and state-building processes. As soon as the de facto state’s nation-building 
 8 
project becomes hijacked by clan and tribal interests, popular mobilisation and nationalist 
awareness may easily turn into clan in-fighting. Inter-clan and tribal tensions may not only 
undermine nation-building, but might also weaken de facto state’s armed forces and scare off 
external patrons.  
Some de facto states (for example, Somaliland and Puntland) have managed to avoid 
clan and tribal fractionalisation due to effective inter-clan consensus building. However, even 
in these two Somalian polities, nation-building processes have not succeeded in overcoming 
clan and tribal identities in politics (Ahmed 1999). For other de facto states, clan and tribal 
divisions have proven deadly. The Katanga state in eastern Congo, as well as Nigeria’s 
Biafra, are amongst the examples of de facto states weakened by tribal divisions. In both 
cases, clannish and tribal disputes heavily contributed to the collapse of these entities and 
their forceful incorporation into the respective parent state. Tribalism has proven dangerous 
even for those de facto states, which have successfully achieved international recognition. 
The ongoing civil war between Dinka and Nuer tribes in the newly minted state of South 
Sudan is an example of tribalism’s impact on secessionist entities. Kosovo is yet another case 




The rise and competition for power of influential warlords, although often closely intertwined 
with tribalism, might prove even more deadly for de facto states. Conflicts amongst rebel 
commanders and various rebel factions are a well-known phenomenon in civil war studies 
(Fjelde and Nilsson 2012). Whilst research on warlordism in de facto states is limited, 
conflict amongst warlords following an effective secessionist campaign are very likely to 
occur. Conflicts between warlords belonging to the same rebel organisation become 
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particularly acute when external threat either disappears or becomes less imminent. In-
fighting within Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) followed in 2013, just two years 
after South Sudan’s independence and rapidly developed in a full-scale civil war between two 
prominent ex-warlords, president Salva Kiir and his deputy Riek Machar. Although South 
Sudan’s civil conflict is fought over tribal divisions, power struggle of influential warlords 
had been instrumental towards the split within SPLA. In the same vein, warlordism has had a 
significant divisive effect on the collapse of Tamil Eelam (Stokke 2006).  
The threat of warlordism is particularly destructive for newly emerged de facto states, 
with a recent history of civil war and the lack of economic prospects for rebel fighters. The 
inability of de facto states’ leadership to provide employment opportunities for former rebels, 
either in security forces or beyond, enables warlords to keep their private armed forces and to 
rely on them in power struggles. Due to the potentially divisive role of power-seeking 
warlords in weak and fragile states, literature on state failure tends to closely associate 




The emergence of splinter groups with more radical ideology than the parent organisation has 
been a feature of many insurgent organisations (O’Balance 1981; Silke 1998). Governments 
of newly-emerged de facto entities are often composed of a wide diversity of former rebel 
groups, characterised not only by ethnic, tribal and clan-based divisions, but also by 
ideological boundaries. Although ideological rifts within de facto states might be embedded 
in ethnic divisions, tribalism and warlordism, this form of fractionalisation is best 
characterised by divisions along religious-sectarian or political lines. Bearing in mind that 
state ideology is crucial for the effective nation-building, failure of de facto leadership to 
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reconcile ideological differences may endanger the entire state-building project. Simply 
because ideological conflicts may involve larger numbers of participants and develop higher 
degrees of radicalisation, these conflicts might prove far more serious and consequential than 
tribal in-fighting, or warlord disagreements. Resolving ideological conflicts might also prove 
a much harder task than settling tribal or individual disagreements. Ideological rifts had been 
instrumental towards state fragility and failure in many parts of the world. Sectarian conflicts 
in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, religion-fuelled civil wars in Central African Republic and northern 
Nigeria, as well as south Thailand and Myanmar’s Rohingya insurgencies, are amongst the 
examples of state failure cases induced by ideological fractionalisation. 
Similarly to sovereign states, de facto polities are susceptible to ideological conflicts. 
Split within Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) – an organisation controlling the de 
facto independent Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, or ARMM, in the Philippines – 
contributed to the emergence of more ideologically-centred Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF), as well as the al-Qaeda affiliated Aby Sayyaf group. The emergence of MILF, and 
particularly, of the radical Islamist Abu Sayyaf group, had been detrimental for the ARMM’s 
autonomy and significantly limited its chances of either international recognition or cessation 
from the Philippines. Ideological fractionalisation has proven even more destructive for the 
Palestinian autonomous territories torn, amongst other challenges, by ideological rivalry 




Few cases of state failure occur without economic collapse. Whilst some states tend to fail 
exclusively due to conflict-related causes, in the majority of cases, economic deficiencies 
either accompany failure or precede it (Iqbal and Starr 2015, 52-54). Bearing in mind that in 
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contrast to sovereign states, de facto states tend to lack developed industrial bases and have 
little or no experience of economic production, they are even more vulnerable to economic 
collapse than recognised states. Even for resource rich secessionist territories, such as Biafra, 
Katanga, South Sudan and many others, access to rich mineral resources did not guarantee 
economic security. Since many resource-rich provinces are used as mere sites of resource 
extraction, they rarely have appropriate industrial facilities needed to process and store fossil 
fuels and other natural resources.  
Absence of a patron state willing to subsidise a de facto entity, presents an 
insurmountable challenge for newly-minted de facto states. Lacking constant funding from a 
patron state, such as that provided by Russia to South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and the eastern 
Ukrainian de facto states, many de facto polities transform into hubs of drug trade, 
smuggling, poaching, trade in illicit goods and items (for example, endangered wildlife), and 
human trafficking. Whilst Myanmar’s Wa (de facto) state is renowned for its trade in 
protected wildlife,v two other of Myanmar’s de facto entities – Karen and Kachin states – are 
notorious for drug production and illicit trade in gems and timber. Tamil Eelam procured 
significant portion of its funding from the extortion of taxes from Tamil Diasporas abroad 
(Wayland 2004).  
The lack of international recognition further limits the de facto states’ opportunities to 
receive economic aid from abroad and reduces their legal financial interactions with the rest 
of the world. As unrecognised territories, de facto states are not entitled to economic 
assistance from international financial institutions, such as the World Bank or International 
Monetary Fund. Most international banks, companies and organisations tend to avoid dealing 
with de facto states and normally maintain no presence on their territory. Not only de facto 
states are deprived of opportunities to trade internationally, but, often due to the pressure 
from the parent state, are unable to even trade with their neighbours. Whilst most de facto 
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territories lack industrial bases, limited opportunities to export their production legally, 
further decrease the de facto states’ chances to develop their industries.   
All of the above suggests that from the moment of their inception, many de facto states 
remain highly vulnerable to economic downfall. Faced with economic collapse, de facto 
entities would be unable to provide basic public goods to the population and might find their 
military disintegrate into factions along tribal, sectarian, or ethnic divisions. Economic 
collapse would also enable the parent state to wage effective financial and trade blockade of 
its breakaway regions. Above all, the inability of the de facto states’ leadership to 
demonstrate to the population that their nation-building project is not sustainable is a 
precursor of state failure.      
 
 
De facto state failure: Chechnya (1996-99) 
 
Following the failed hardcore-Communist coup d'état of August 1991 in Moscow, Chechnya’s 
separatist elites declared independence from Russia in mid-September, which led to three years 
of semi-independent statehood. In December 1994, expecting a Blitzkrieg, Russian Army 
marched into the breakaway republic situated in the eastern part of the Muslim-majority North 
Caucasus. A full-fledged war followed, with Russian military deploying largely indiscriminate 
violence and thousands of Chechens mobilising into insurgent groups, exponential 
mobilisation facilitated by the persistence in Chechen society of the clan organisation and the 
custom of blood revenge (Souleimanov and Aliyev 2015). The war cost the lives of dozens of 
thousands of Chechens, predominantly civilians (Cichocki 1997, 11-12). Local insurgent 
groups mushroomed in the course of the war, most of them driven by the idea of Chechen 
ethno-nationalism, managing to inflict sensitive blows to the superior invading force. As a 
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result of its incapacity to break the backbone of the popular resistance movement, Russian army 
pulled out of the rebellious republic in Fall 1996 (Dunlop 2004). This move was widely 
considered as Moscow's humiliating defeat to the improvised military force of a country 




Interwar Chechnya (1996-1999) was a country in ruins. Following an all-out war that lasted 21 
months, most cities and villages – with the exception of the country’s pro-Russian northern 
areas that evaded warfare – were decimated, with hundreds of thousands of civilians having 
become internal refugees or left Chechnya. According to some estimates, by late 1996, up to 
70 per cent of Chechnya’s housing stock had been either destroyed completely or severely 
damaged (Souleimanov 2006; Souleimanov and Aliyev 2016). The war annihilated 
Chechnya’s infrastructure. Factories and processing plants were thoroughly bombarded. Roads 
barely existed. Healthcare, education facilities, and jobs were nearly missing, with 
unemployment rates reaching as high as 80 per cent and close to 100 per cent in young people.vi 
Mines lay under roughly 5.000 hectares of Chechnya’s territory, which made 15 per cent of the 
republic’s cultivable soil. This caused frequent deaths and injuries, complicating 
communication, and hampering farming work (Blandy 2003).  
 In addition, over the course of the war, some established animosities revived between 
various groups of Chechen populace. To an extent, the highlanders vs. lowlanders divide 
braced up, boosted by what the highlanders considered as their most active engagement in the 
war effort compared to the urban dwellers’ and lowlanders’ relative inertia. Members of the 
“treacherous” clans and families – that is, the clans and families that allegedly cooperated with 
the Russian occupiers or failed to exert adequate resistance to them – were sometimes targeted 
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(Souleimanov 2015; Souleimanov and Aliyev 2017; Souleimanov, Aliyev, and Ratelle 2016). 
As Grozny’s authority was weak or absent – an important condition that we detail further in 
the article – lawlessness spread across the republic following Russian military’s withdrawal 
from Chechnya in the fall of 1996.  
  Against the background of post-war anarchy and economic decline, the societal role of 
Chechen clan – the age-old institute of patrilineally-defined kinship – increased as the single 
source of social security for the population. To survive, relatives took increased care of each 
other, both economically and as protectors. Thousands of Chechens with damaged or destroyed 
houses, particularly those stemming from the heavily bombarded urban areas, sought refuge in 
the villages inhabited by their relatives. Those who lacked financial resources were supported 
by their relatives who were lucky enough to live off their undamaged livestock. In the situation 
of self-help, relatives sought to stick with each other in order to survive attacks by antagonised 
clans or simply defend their interests and honour.vii  All in all, this contributed to the upswing 
of clan-based solidarity networks or, as this phenomenon has been widely termed, tribalism.viii 
 The post-war rise of Chechen clan was an important factor undermining the authority 
of the central government in Grozny. On the one hand, the persistence of Chechen clan was 
crucial for the survival of the entire post-war generation. On the other hand, Chechen clan and 
the related mind set of clan-based in-group favouritism and out-group mistrust and 
discrimination implied that those in the leading positions in Grozny and elsewhere sought to 
assert their relatives’ interests at the expense of the abstract idea of the Chechen people’s or 
Chechen nation-state’s shared interest. Formal and informal positions in the republic were held 
by the relatives of local chiefs, with professional merit playing minimal or no role in their 
(informal) appointments. Clan-based particularism led to the frequent embezzlement of thin 
funds allocated from Grozny to the provinces. Overall, attributing a strong personal element to 
republican and local politics, clan-based particularism generated immense tension in Chechen 
 15 
society while paralyzing the institutions of Chechen state and reducing popular trust in it. 
Intriguingly, Chechen president Aslan Maskhadovix himself, albeit being initially opposed to 
clan particularism, soon came to appoint the members of his clan in the leading governmental 
positions in order to ensure the integrity and continuity of his office’s policies (Souleimanov 
2006, 130).  
 This having been said, for most Chechens struggling for everyday survival, what 
mattered was the effective institute of clan solidarity. Kinship networks, unlike the ill-
functioning or absent central government, enabled most Chechen families to make the ends 
meet; it was their relatives who were capable and willing to provide support to them, not the 




Related to Chechen clan-based particularism was the persistence of strong warlord elite in post-
war Chechnya. At the beginning of his term in office in early 1997, Maskhadov “was already 
confronted with the necessity of finding arrangements with various war chiefs [warlords] who 
strengthened their fiefs during the war and did not intend to submit themselves to a man who 
was nevertheless the leader of the Chechen army” (Merlin 2012). In early 1997, Maskhadov 
indeed gave important positions in the government to leading “brigadier generals”, including 
Shamil Basayev,x who was appointed the country’s first vice-premier, as well as to Aslan 
Ismailov, Aslanbek Abdulkhajiyev, and Ruslan Gilayev (Tarasov 1997, 3). Maskhadov’s 
initiative was to win over the key warlords, cementing their loyalty to the central government 
in Grozny.  
 Others were less successful though. In fact, soon thereafter, many leading war veterans, 
particularly warlords, saw the collapse of their ambitious expectations to attain power and 
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prestige in the newly established state institutions. Post-war Chechnya’s resources were simply 
too limited to accommodate all aspirants and their far-reaching expectations. Many warlords 
who saw themselves unjustly deprived of the fair share of the republic’s economic and political 
pie soon took an immense dislike in the central authority in Grozny. Instead of disarming their 
units – or acknowledging the superiority of the central government in Grozny – dozens of 
warlords thus sought to strengthen control over their respective “spheres of influence”, usually 
native villages, while recognising Grozny’s central authority only symbolically or refusing to 
recognise it whatsoever.  
 Claiming that they only recognised “Allah’s supremacy” – and questioning the 
legitimacy of the Grozny government –  the warlords solidified their military and political 
power, often at the expense of the competing clans. This, too, contributed to the strengthening 
of clan solidarity. In some occasions, heated confrontation led to armed clashes, with which 
Grozny usually hesitated to interfere. As warlords usually led their respective units, made up 
of their neighbours or clan relatives, the difficulty in the warlords’ return to peaceful life 
complicated the reintegration of ordinary war veterans as well (Merlin 2012). To address this 
pressing challenge, Maskhadov famously declared in his 1998 appeal to the nation that  
 
 [w]e spent many long years walking along the path of war with 
certainty and dignity: However, now we have suddenly changed 
entirely. Yesterday's comrades-in-arms look at one another with 
mistrust because the seed of discord has been sown amongst them and 
its name is ambition for power!xi  
 
Under these circumstances, for Maskhadov to claim back control over the rebellious warlords-
controlled areas could lead to a full-fledged military confrontation and civil war. To avoid the 
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latter, the Chechen president choose to tolerate the existence of warlord-dominated “fiefdoms”, 
which further weakened Chechen state institutions.  
 The situation was exacerbated by some warlords’ involvement in criminal activities 
both in Chechnya and in Russia. By the late 1990s, kidnappings in order to exert ransom, 
confiscation of property, illegal exploitation of Chechen oil wells, and business with stolen cars 
became a daily norm (Lo and Kwok 2012, 38). Grozny’s lack of ability to put an end to these 
activities further weakened the idea of Chechen statehood in general and Maskhadov’s 




Intertwined with the above two factors were the ideological frictions that afflicted Chechen 
elites and population in the interwar period. In fact, drawing on ideological considerations, an 
influential segment of Chechen “brigadier generals”, led by the infamous warlord Shamil 
Basayev, soon challenged the authority of the central government in Grozny in general and of 
president Maskhadov in particular. Inspired by Salafi-jihadism, an ideology imported in the 
country in the early 1990s by the Middle Eastern missionaries and particularly ethnic-Arab 
foreign fighters, Basayev and his associates grew increasingly opposed to the secularist rule of 
president Maskhadov.xii  
 Against the background of the jihadists’ increasingly strong standing in the republic, 
two warring camps soon crystallised. One camp was made up of the nationalists or Ichkerians 
who adhered to the traditional Sufi virds (brotherhoods). Albeit the Ichkerians’ attitude towards 
the central authority in Grozny was ambivalent, with many leading Ichkerians holding sceptical 
or autonomist stance toward Maskhadov’s regime and others refusing to acknowledge 
Grozny’s authority on the ground, they generally supported the idea of secular Chechen state, 
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albeit with religious elements. The opposing camp was represented by Salafi-jihadists, a highly 
disciplined and tight-knit community of ethnic-Chechens and foreign fighters. Salafi-jihadists, 
who had acquired fame for military successes in the 1994-1996 war, disputed the very 
legitimacy of Chechen nation-state, which they considered un-Islamic, calling for the 
establishment of a Salafi theocracy instead (Rich and Conduit 2015; Wilhelmsen 2005).  
 While Maskhadov initially sought to achieve social consensus, for instance calling in 
1998 for the incorporation of sharia-based legal principles into Chechnya’s jurisdiction, his 
efforts fell short of accommodating the increasingly self-confident Salafi community. 
Maskhadov’s efforts to win Basayev over eventually failed, as well. In 1998, Basayev (who 
earlier resigned from the position of deputy prime minister) was again given the post of prime 
minister, while Basayev’s younger brother Shirwani was appointed to the lucrative position of 
the Director of the State Committee for Energy Resources. Yet in mid-1998, Basayev again 
resigned, allegedly because of the Chechen president’s incapacity to execute his plans. Upon 
his resignation, Basayev further strengthened his alliance with the jihadists.  
 In June 1998, the tension between Sufi and Salafi elites reached their peak during the 
armed clashes in Chechnya’s second largest city of Gudermes, in which around 50 gunmen, 
predominantly Salafis, were killed by Maskhadov loyalists. Soon thereafter, Maskhadov 
dismissed Salafi ministers and sympathizers and urged Chechens to expel “Wahhabis”, as 
Salafis were pejoratively named, from their neighbourhoods and villages. In fall 1998, a 
congress of Chechen Muslim clergy took place in Grozny, which formally outlawed Salafis, 
accusing them of extremism, heresy, and plans to topple the legitimate government 
(Souleimanov 2006, 142). Still, Grozny sought to eschew massive armed confrontation with 
the Salafis, with numerically superior Maskhadov loyalists refraining from targeting the Salafi 
groups.  
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 Nevertheless, in early 1999, in an effort to strengthen the legitimacy of his government 
and to scupper the Salafis’ plans to declare an Islamic theocracy, Maskhadov announced the 
establishment of a full-fledged sharia government. While this move was welcomed reservedly 
by Ichkerian elites and secularly minded stratum of Chechen populace, the Salafis sought to 
capitalise on it to the fullest. In Basayev’s words, “our president has finally accepted Islam. He 
is no longer the president; hence we should elect an imam” (Souleimanov 2006, 142). Hence, 
this initiative to bridge the warring camps of Chechen society, it soon proved 
counterproductive.  
 In a similar vein, the Sufi-Salafi sectarian face-off spread across the country affecting 
the lives of ordinary people. In line with their religious dogma, Salafis considered heretical the 
veneration of Sufi saints along with some “pagan” practices associated with Chechen “folk 
Islam” (Meijer 2009). Sometimes, they deliberately destroyed the sites of pilgrimage of Sufi 
saints (murshids and ustadhs) and showed utmost disrespect toward what they saw as customs 
unrelated to the “true” Islam. Salafis also questioned the notion of clan solidarity along with 
the norms of the adat, Chechen customary law, enshrined in the socio-cultural foundations of 
Chechen society. The Salafis’ explicit lack of respect toward clan elderly (vokkhstag), unheard 
of in the deeply patriarchal Chechnya, frequently led to the split of Chechen clans, from which 
the “Arabised youth” was expelled.xiii  
 Oftentimes, theological discord penetrated not only the social fabric of Chechen clans. 
It also led to violent confrontation between members of neighbouring – Sufi and Salafi-
majority – villages. Sectarian violence driven by ideological fractionalisation further impaired 
the idea of Chechen nation-state, undermining its social and ideo-political foundations. The 
majority of those supporting the Salafis or self-identifying as Salafis increasingly resented 
Maskhadov’s alien and presumably non-Islamic government in Grozny, refusing to 
acknowledge his authority. At the same time, many Sufi nationalists grew increasingly 
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sceptical toward Maskhadov’s regime, accusing him of his incapacity to adequately cope with 
the “Wahhabi” threat (Bedford and Souleimanov 2016; Aliyev 2010). As a result, toward 1998-
1999, Chechnya effectively turned into a failed state as the government grew increasingly 




By 1996, Chechnya’s formal economy, infrastructure, and industry had been completely 
destroyed. Following the war, chemical industry, an important segment of the republic’s 
economy in the Soviet decades, already dramatically weakened in the early 1990s, was defunct. 
Most oil wells, scattered across the republic’s central areas, were controlled by warlords who 
were involved in its illegal exploitation and exports. By 1998, around 843.000 tons of oil had 
been produced – and sold out – illegally in Chechnya, without Grozny’s control (Zurcher 2007, 
104). Thus, the Grozny authorities had no sufficient income from the republic’s relatively 
significant oil reserves; nor were they capable of extorting taxes from the illegal exploitation 
of Chechnya’s oil reserves (ibid.).  
 This having been said, interwar Chechnya’s shadow economy – involving ransom 
money acquired from kidnappings, robberies, illegal seizure of property, illegal trade – was 
sizeable. According to some estimates, kidnappers alone procured around 200 million dollars 
in the three-year period of Chechnya’s de facto independence (Tishkov 2004, 114). 
Maskhadov’s episodic efforts to consolidate control over the republic’s oil exploitation failed, 
and “Maskhadov was thus robbed of the possibility of stabilizing his regime by means of a 
patron-client network redistributing oil revenues” (Zurcher 2007, 104). In the interwar period, 
only about 10 per cent of Chechnya’s population was legally employed (Moskalev 1996). 
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 In the early years of interwar Chechnya, Maskhadov’s government sought to pressure 
Moscow to invest in the rebuilding of the devastated country. Russian and Chechen authorities 
were engaged in talks on making Chechnya a free-trade zone with special tax concessions. 
There was general consensus that Chechnya would remain in the rouble zone, likely remaining 
part of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) economically, financially and 
politically. Importantly, even Chechen radicals, for instance, Basayev, admitted Chechnya 
should remain in Russia’s economic and energy spheres (Batuev 1997, 8). However, reaching 
an agreement on the size and conditions of economic support for Chechnya proved eventually 
impossible. On the one hand, Grozny insisted on acquiring Russian economic support – or even 
war reparations – regardless of discussion of Chechnya’s legal status. On the other hand, 
Moscow conditioned its economic support for Chechnya by cementing the breakaway 
republic’s subordinate standing toward the federal centre. Russian authorities also prompted 
Chechen authorities’ efforts to crack down on illegal businesses run from Chechnya-based 
warlords, which posed a serious threat to the socio-economic security of Russia’s southern 
provinces.  In fact,  
 
Russian politicians feared that the Chechens would take the most 
advantageous way: in terms of the economy, to stay in Russia, while 
politically pursuing independence […]  Moscow has been unwilling to 
render Chechnya large-scale economic assistance, unless the Chechen 
leadership agrees to power sharing between the federal centre and 
Chechnya as a ‘member’ of the federation (Oguz 1997, 4).  
 
In early 1997, Moscow made clear to the newly elected Maskhadov government that it could 
only allocate around 757 billion roubles allocated to Chechnya in the 1997, a promise that 
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eventually failed to materialise due to Moscow’s and Groznys’ critically opposing views. At 
the same time, Moscow dismissed Chechnya’s demands for paying war reparations (Katin 
1997, 1-3). Moreover, Grozny dismissed the so-called Tatarstan model. This model, advocated 
by Moscow, sought to render Chechnya considerable fiscal autonomy within Russia’s political 




In August 1999, a joint Chechen-Dagestani Salafi-jihadist force invaded the westernmost areas 
of the neighbouring republic of Dagestan. Led by Basayev and his ethnically diverse jihadist 
entourage, the invasion’s declared goal was to aid a group of Salafi-dominated villages in 
central Dagestan, a multi-ethnic Sunni-majority autonomous republic to the east of Chechnya. 
The Chechen-Dagestani invaders, supported by dozens of foreign fighters, apparently sought 
to instigate a large anti-Russian rebellion first in Dagestan and then across the whole of the 
Russian-dominated North Caucasus. Basayev himself used the invasion to declare himself the 
imam of a united theocracy of Chechnya and Dagestan – and oust Maskhadov as head of the 
Chechen nation-state that was now seen as out-to-date. While the attack soon proved to a be 
complete disaster, with Dagestanis mobilising to resist the Salafi invaders, the invasion 
alongside the bomb blasts in apartment buildings in Russian cities itself were used by Moscow 
as a pretext to re-launch war on Chechnya.xiv Maskhadov’s feverish efforts to regain control 
over the Basayev group – or strike a compromise deal with Moscow in order to pull back an 
evolving military confrontation with Russia – ultimately failed as neither Basayev nor Kremlin 
showed interest in negotiating with Grozny (Williams 1999). Having reorganised military 
considerably, Russian army regained control over Chechnya by the early 2000, leading to a 
protracted insurgency and counterinsurgency that has been underway since (Kramer 2005; 
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Dannreuther and March 2008; Ratelle and Souleimanov 2016; Souleimanov 2015; 
Souleimanov and Aliyev 2017; Aliyev 2016). While the Russian invasion of 1999-2000 was 
the main factor leading to the ultimate fall of Chechen statehood, we show in this article that 
four under-researched in the literature on de facto state failure causes, tribalism, economic 
deficiency, warlordism, and ideological fractionalisation, had prior to the beginning of the 





The Chechen de facto state was born out of civil war similarly to many other de facto polities. 
It was not economically self-sustainable and lacked external patron who would provide it 
with economic aid and some form of protection. However, the economic deficiency was 
accompanied by deeply-rooted disagreements within the separatist movement. Clan divisions, 
warlord politics and sectarian rifts had undermined Chechen nation-building processes at 
their early stages. A combination of the above detailed causes contributed to state failure in 
Chechnya well before the 1999 Russian invasion. Whilst the international community 
remained sympathetic to the plight of Chechens, few international actors favoured the idea of 
Chechen independence and were willing to openly support the Chechen de facto state. 
Internal weaknesses shattered Chechen armed forces transforming military into a patchwork 
of warlord bands, making the de facto entity vulnerable to external aggression. The weakness 
of the parent state – Russian Federation – which it had demonstrated during the First 
Chechnya War, was not a static condition. As a matter of fact, the failure of Chechen nation- 
and state-building was accompanied by the strengthening of these processes in the Russian 
Federation.  
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Similarly to fragile and failing sovereign states, de facto entities are likely to be 
affected by analogous failure factors, most of which are related to civil violence and the 
economic collapse. The Chechen case demonstrates that these failure factors become even 
more acute in de facto entities, which usually lack the experience of statehood. In the 1990s 
Chechnya, high levels of national self-consciousness contributed to the rise of Chechen 
nationalism, which in its turn enabled Chechen separatists to succeed during the First 
Chechnya War. However, the failure of independent Chechen nation-building in the inter-war 
period demonstrated that nationalism does not ensure the success of de facto statehood and 
that nation-building is vulnerable to internal cleavages.  
Deep divisions within the separatist camp, economic crisis, which was both a result and 
cause of Chechen society’s internal divisions, along with the ability of the parent state to 
overcome its weaknesses had to various degrees contributed to the collapse of Chechen 
statehood. Since all of these deficiencies are not specific to the Chechen case, but notable in 
many other de facto states, including the failed cases (Krajina, Tamil Eelam, Biafra, 
Katanga), de facto states are likely to suffer from similar failure-factors. That said, this study 
opens avenues for future research on the topic of de facto states’ failure, emphasising the 
need to examine not only the rise but also fall of de facto statehood. The most obvious 
observation to emerge from this analysis is that de facto states are not immune to failure, and 
that failure occurs not simply as a result of failed nation-building, military weakness and the 






Ahmed, Ismail I. 1999. "The heritage of war and state collapse in Somalia and Somaliland: 
local-level effects, external interventions and reconstruction." Third World Quarterly 
20, no. 1: 113-127. 
Aliyev, Huseyn. 2010. “Peace-building from the Bottom: A Case Study of the North 
Caucasus.” Caucasian Review of International Affairs 4, no. 4: 325-341. 
Aliyev, Huseyn. 2016. “Conflict-related violence decreases in the North Caucasus as fighters 
go to Syria.” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst 17, no. 6: 13-16. 
Aliyev, Huseyn. 2016. “Strong militias, weak states and armed violence. Towards a theory of 
‘state-parallel’ paramilitaries.” Security Dialogue 47, no. 6: 498-516.  
Aliyev, Huseyn. 2017. “Precipitating state failure: Do civil wars and violent non-state actors 
create failed states?” Third World Quarterly 38, no. 9: 1973-1989. 
Aliyev, Huseyn. 2017. When informal institutions change. Institutional reforms and informal 
practices in the former Soviet Union. Ann Harbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Baev, Pavel. 1998. Russia's Policies in Secessionist Conflicts in Europe in the 1990s. Oslo: 
Norwegian Atlantic Committee. 
 Batuev, V., 1997. “Shamil Basayev: Skoro poedem v Budennovsk s pokayaniem,” 
Argumenty i fakty 3. No.848, January 1997: 8. 
Bedford, Sofie, and Emil Aslan Souleimanov. 2016. "Under construction and highly 
contested: Islam in the post-Soviet Caucasus." Third World Quarterly 37, no. 9: 1559-
1580. 
Beissinger, Mark, and M. Crawford Young. 2002. Beyond state crisis?: post-colonial Africa 
and post-Soviet Eurasia in comparative perspective. Washington DC: Woodrow 
Wilson Center Press. 
Blandy, Charles W. 2003. "The Federal Response to Chechen Independence: Occupy, 
Liberate, Obliterate." 
 26 
Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min. 2010. "Why do ethnic groups rebel? 
New data and analysis." World Politics 62, no. 01: 87-119. 
Cichocki, Jacek. 1997. Konflikt rosyjsko-czeczenski, dzieje konfliktu, woyna 
rosyjskoczeczenska 1994–1996 i obecna sytuacja w Republice Czeczenskiej-Iczkerii, 
(The Russian-Chechen Conflict, Its History, the Russian-Chechen War of 1994-1996 
and the Overall Situation in the Chechen Republic of Ichkeriya) (Warsaw: OSW, 
1997): 11–12. 
Dannreuther, Roland, and Luke March. 2008. "Chechnya: has Moscow won?." Survival 50, 
no. 4: 97-112. 
Dunlop, John. 2014. The Moscow bombings of September 1999: examinations of Russian 
terrorist attacks at the onset of Vladimir Putin's rule. Vol. 110. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Dunlop, John B. 1998. Russia confronts Chechnya: roots of a separatist conflict. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Fjelde, Hanne, and Desirée Nilsson. 2012. "Rebels against rebels: Explaining violence 
between rebel groups." Journal of Conflict Resolution 56, no. 4: 604-628. 
Florea, Adrian. 2014. "De Facto States in International Politics (1945–2011): A New Data 
Set." International Interactions 40, no. 5: 788-811. 
Iqbal, Zaryab, and Harvey Starr. 2015. State failure in the modern world. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press,. 
Kaltcheva, Tzvetomira. 2009. "Kosovo’s Post-independence Inter-clan conflict." Human 
Security Journal 2: 113-124. 
Katin, V., 1997. “Moskva prodalzhaet schitat’ Chechnyu sub’ektom federatsii.” Nezavsimaya 
gazeta 30 January 1997, no.1: 3. 
 27 
Kolossov, Vladimir, and John O'Loughlin. 1998. "Pseudo‐States as Harbingers of a new 
geopolitics: The example of the trans‐dniester Moldovan republic (TMR)." 
Geopolitics 3, no. 1: 151-176. 
Kolstø, Pål. 2006. "The sustainability and future of unrecognized quasi-states." Journal of 
Peace Research 43, no. 6: 723-740. 
Kramer, Mark. 2005. "Guerrilla warfare, counterinsurgency and terrorism in the North 
Caucasus: The military dimension of the Russian–Chechen conflict." Europe-Asia 
Studies 57, no. 2: 209-290. 
Krasner, Stephen D. 2004. "Sharing sovereignty: New institutions for collapsed and failing 
states." International security 29, no. 2: 85-120. 
Kraxberger, Brennan M. 2007. "Failed states: temporary obstacles to democratic diffusion or 
fundamental holes in the world political map?." Third world Quarterly 28, no. 6: 
1055-1071. 
Kuzio, Taras. 2014. “Crime, politics and business in 1990s Ukraine.” Communist and post-
communist studies 47, no.2: 195-210. 
Lo, T. Wing, and Sharon Ingrid Kwok. 2012. "Traditional organized crime in the modern 
world: how triad societies respond to socioeconomic change." In Traditional 
Organized Crime in the Modern World, pp. 67-89. New York: Springer. 
Malejacq, Romain. 2016. "Warlords, Intervention, and State Consolidation: A Typology of 
Political Orders in Weak and Failed States." Security Studies 25, no. 1: 85-110. 
Meijer, Roel. 2009. Global Salafism: Islam's new religious movement. London: Hurst & Co. 
Merlin, Aude. 2012. "The Postwar Period in Chechnya: When Spoilers Jeopardize the 
Emerging Chechen State (1996–1999)." In War Veterans in Postwar Situations, pp. 
219-239. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 28 
Moskalev, Boris. 1996. "The Anatomy of the Chechen Conflict." Mediterranean Quarterly 7: 
99-117. 
O'Ballance, Edgar. 1981. "IRA leadership problems." Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 5, no. 
1-2: 73-82. 
Oguz, C. 1997. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN CHECHNYA AND RUSSIA SINCE THE 
ELECTION OF A. MASKHADOV (JANUARY-MAY 1997). Ankara: Center for 
Strategic Research.  
Oliker, Olga. 2001. Russia's Chechen wars 1994-2000: lessons from urban combat. Santa 
Monica, CA: Rand Corporation. 
Ratelle, Jean-François, and Emil Aslan Souleimanov. 2016. "A Perfect Counterinsurgency? 
Making Sense of Moscow’s Policy of Chechenisation." Europe-Asia Studies 68, no. 8: 
1287-1314. 
Rich, Ben, and Dara Conduit. 2015. "The impact of jihadist foreign fighters on indigenous 
secular-nationalist causes: Contrasting Chechnya and Syria." Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism 38, no. 2: 113-131. 
Rotberg, Robert I., ed. 2004. State failure and state weakness in a time of terror. Washington 
DC: Brookings Institution Press. 
Rotberg, Robert I., ed. 2010. When states fail: causes and consequences. NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Silke, Andrew. 1998. "In defense of the realm: Financing loyalist terrorism in Northern 
Ireland—part one: Extortion and blackmail." Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 21, no. 
4: 331-361. 
Souleimanov, Emil. 2006. An endless war: the Russian-Chechen conflict in perspective. 
Peter Lang. 
 29 
Souleimanov, Emil. 2015. "An ethnography of counterinsurgency: kadyrovtsy and Russia's 
policy of Chechenization." Post-Soviet Affairs 31, no. 2: 91-114. 
Souleimanov, Emil A. 2015. "Jihad or Security? Understanding the Jihadization of Chechen 
Insurgency through Recruitment into Jihadist Units." Journal of Balkan and Near 
Eastern Studies 17, no. 1: 86-105. 
Souleimanov, Emil A., and Huseyn Aliyev. 2014. Individual Disengagement of Avengers, 
Nationalists and Jihadists: Why Ex-Militants Choose to Abandon Violence in the 
North Caucasus. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Souleimanov, Emil A., and Huseyn Aliyev. 2015. "Blood Revenge and Violent Mobilization: 
Evidence from the Chechen Wars." International Security 40, no. 2: 158-180. 
Souleimanov, Emil A., and Huseyn Aliyev. 2015. “Asymmetry of Values, Indigenous Forces, 
and Incumbent Success in Counterinsurgency: Evidence from Chechnya.” Journal of 
Strategic Studies 38, no. 5: 678-703. 
Souleimanov, Emil A., and Huseyn Aliyev. 2016. “Evaluating the efficacy of indigenous 
forces in counterinsurgency: Lessons from Chechnya and Dagestan.” Small Wars & 
Insurgencies 27, no.3: 392-416. 
Souleimanov, Emil A., and Huseyn Aliyev. 2017. How socio-cultural codes shaped violent 
mobilisation and pro-insurgent support in Chechen Wars. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan.  
Souleimanov, Emil A., Huseyn Aliyev, and Jean-Francoise Ratelle. 2016. “Defected and 
loyal? A case-study of anti-defection mechanisms in Chechen paramilitaries.” 
Terrorism & Political Violence. DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2016.1194270. 
Stokke, Kristian. 2006. "Building the Tamil Eelam State: emerging state institutions and 
forms of governance in LTTE-controlled areas in Sri Lanka." Third World Quarterly 
27, no. 6: 1021-1040. 
 30 
Tarasov, S. 1997. ‘Shamil’ Basayev eshche ne navoevalcya’, Segodnya, 3 April 1997: 3. 
Tishkov, Valery. 2004. Chechnya: Life in a war-torn society. Vol. 6. Univ of California 
Press. 
 Vinci, Anthony. 2008. "Anarchy, failed states, and armed groups: Reconsidering 
conventional analysis." International Studies Quarterly 52, no. 2: 295-314. 
Wayland, Sarah. 2004. "Ethnonationalist networks and transnational opportunities: the Sri 
Lankan Tamil diaspora." Review of International Studies 30, no. 03: 405-426. 
Wilhelmsen, Julie. 2005. "Between a rock and a hard place: The Islamisation of the Chechen 
separatist movement." Europe-Asia Studies 57, no. 1: 35-59. 
Williams, Daniel. 1999. “Peace pleas unanswered, Chechens say.” The Washigton Post, 19 
October, A19. 
Zurcher, Christoph. 2007. The post-Soviet wars: Rebellion, ethnic conflict, and nationhood in 
the Caucasus. New York: NYU Press. 
 
Notes  
i   We borrow our definition of de facto state from Florea (2014, 791-92), who describes 
as de facto state a polity that belongs to a recognised state, but seeks independence, and that 
exerts military control over its territory, provides basic governance, lacks international 
recognition and has managed to survive for at least 24 months. We prefer Florea’s (2014) 
definition over other definitions of de facto state (for example, Kolstø’s (2006) definition), as 
it enables us to include a broader range of de facto entities, particularly in the post-Soviet 
region. This definition also allows to cover most types of unrecognised political entities in post-
WWII period, as detailed by Florea (2014).  
ii  We use Iqbal and Starr’s (2015, 12) generic definition of state failure, which is 
“focused on the complete collapse of state authority.” 
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iii See http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/.  
iv  For complete list of failed and successful unrecognised polities, see Florea (2014, 
793). 
v  See more on BBC News “Drugs, money and wildlife in Myanmar's most secret state”, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37996473 
vi  See Nezavisimaya gazeta, October 28, 1997.  
vii  Authors’ discussions with dozens of Chechen survivors of the First (and Second) 
Russian-Chechen wars.  
viii  Distinct terms are used to refer to clans (nekye) and tribes (teip) in Chechen society. 
For the purpose of this article and to integrate its findings into general literature, a broader term 
tribe is used.  
ix  Aslan Maskhadov was the third president of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, 
following the legendary Jokhar Dudayev (1991-1996) and Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev (1996-
1997). A former Soviet military officer, Maskhadov was initially sympathetic to Dudayev’s 
idea of establishing strong and unified secular statehood.  
x  Shamil Basayev was a key Chechen warlord. Considered by many Chechens a hero 
and a traitor, he played an important role in shaping Chechen resistance during the First 
Russo-Chechen War, in aligning Chechen insurgent groups with jihadist foreign fighters in 
the interwar period, and ultimately in contributing to the relaunch of the Second Russian-
Chechen War.  
xi  Cited according to Valeriy Tishkov, Obshchestvo v vooruzennom konflikte (A Society 
in the Armed Conflict), 447. 
xii  Rumours had it that Basayev grew increasingly antagonistic toward Maskhadov having 
lost elections to him in late 1996, a fact that Basayev never made peace with.  
xiii  Authors’ numerous discussions with Chechen eyewitnesses, 2002-2015.  
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xiv  In late August and September 1999, a series of terrorist attacks hit apartment buildings 
in the Russian cities of Buynaksk, Volgodonsk, and Moscow, killing around 300 people. The 
attacks were widely attributed to the alleged Chechen terrorists’ frustration with their failed 
invasion to Dagestan, which galvanised Russian public opinion preparing it for the re-launch 
of an unpopular war against Chechnya. According to some analysts, these attacks were staged 
by Russian secret services to pave the ground for an invasion, which would help then-prime 
minister Vladimir Putin acquire power in the country. For a detailed analysis of this critical 
episode of Russia’s post-Soviet history, see Dunlop (1998).  
